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The Day After: What if Latin 
America Devalues? 
• Currency risk in Latin America is high and 
rising. Export competitiveness has been 
undermined by appreciating real effective 
exchange rates. Capital inflows are highly 
vulnerable to contagion from Asia. 
• In the medium term, devaluation will hit 
Latin America hard. Its export sector is 
relatively small, its debt-service burden 
high, and there is a significant risk that 
inflation will accelerate. 
• Devaluation can be averted, but at a cost of 
significant economic slowdown. Given the 
negative political ramification of a currency 
meltdown, particularly in Brazil and 
Argentina, monetary policy there has 
already tightened sharply. 
The sharp downward correction in Latin America 
has made many of its equity markets attractive from 
a valuation perspective. In some markets - notably, 
Brazil and Mexico - robust earnings growth is likely 
to improve valuation even further in the months 
ahead.1 
However, investors need to weigh these positives 
against the risk of devaluation. This risk has 
short-term as well as long-term implications: 
• In the short term, a Latin American devaluation 
is bearish for financial assets, at least until the 
currency stabilizes. The first question, then, is 
whether Latin America needs to devalue? In 
other words, are its currencies "too expensive" 
given its increasingly open economies? 
• In the longer-term, the implications for 
financial assets are more complicated. The key 
issue is whether gains in exports will outweigh 
the cost of higher interest rates, a slower 
domestic economy, and rising investor angst. 
In general, the prospects for a regional replay of a 
Mexican-style, export-led recovery are small. On the 
export side, the Latin American economies do not 
1 See "Emerging Markets Earnings: The 'Good', the 'Bad' 
and the 'Ugly'", Special Report, The BCA Emerging 
Markets Strategist, November 10. For a copy, please 
contact our circulation department (Tel: (514) 499-9706; 
e-mail: circ@bcapub.com). 
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enjoy Mexico's preferential access to the US, Asia is 
now much more competitive in third markets, and 
G7 import demand as a whole is more vulnerable. 
And with the currency crisis now spreading 
throughout the emerging markets universe, the 
likelihood for a speedy revival of capital inflow is 
significantly smaller. 
Does Latin America need to devalue? 
The short answer is yes. Constrained by a low 
saving rate, growth spurts in Latin America have 
forced periodic currency "corrections?' The current 
growth spell now calls for another correction, 
although the precise timing is difficult to determine. 
Over the past decade, Latin America's share of 
world exports dropped to 4.1%, down from 5.3% in 
1986. Developing Asia's share, on the other hand, 
has risen to 190/o of the total, up from 11 %. 
Part of the reason is the gradual differential 
appreciation of the Latin American currencies 
against their Asian counterparts. The real effective 
exchange rate of a country reflects the 
"competitiveness" of its currency - relative to its 
trading partners, as well as relative to other 
countries with which it competes indirectly in 
"third markets?' However, because the level of the 
real effective exchange rate is set arbitrarily, it 
cannot tell us whether a currency is "cheap" or 
"expensive" in any absolute sense. The best we can 
do, therefore, is look for relative movements, as we 
do in Chart 5. The chart plots the real effective 
exchange rates of six Latin American currencies, 
divided by a weighted-average real effective 
exchange rate for the developing-Asia region 
(results are normalized with January 1986=100). 
Upward movement on these charts indicates the 
currency is losing competitiveness relative to the 
Asian average. 
In general, the data suggest that Latin America's 
currency competitiveness has deteriorated relative to 
Asia. Of course, the currency alone does not paint 
the full picture of export competitiveness, which is 
also affected by differential productivity gains. Here, 
too, however, Asia was probably doing better: its per 
capita GDP growth over the past decade averaged 
5.9% annually, against 1.30/o Latin America. This is 
an admittedly imperfect measure of productivity in 
the traded-good sector, but it nevertheless conveys 
the general trend.2 
2 The inaccuracy arises first because GDP per capita 
reflects output in the traded sector as well as the non-
traded sector and, second, because it is based on 
population rather than employment levels. 
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Chart 5 
Real Effective Exchange Rates Relative to 
Developing Asia* 
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Now, although on the whole, Asia's export share was 
rising as its currencies were becoming relatively 
cheaper, it was there rather than in Latin America 
that the currency crisis struck firsL 
The reason is probably rooted in Asia's infamous 
overcapacity problem and inflated asset markets, 
but the implications for Latin America are dire all 
the same: 
• First, with Asia having devalued, Latin 
America's relative competitiveness - falling as it 
was going into the crisis - is now even weaker. 
And much like in Asia, once a major Latin 
American country devalues, pressure to do the 
same will quickly radiate to its neighbors. 
• Secondly, currency contagion is affected by 
investors' panic no less than by trade-balance 
fundamentals. Once the Asian crisis began 
gathering momentum, eve-,ything Asian 
appeared risky. As illustrated by the 1995 
Mexico crisis, portfolio investors have 
traditionally treated Latin America en bloc, so if 
they panic, the negative chain reaction will 
likely spread much faster than in Asia. 
These considerations do not make a Latin American 
devaluation cycle imminent, nor do they tell us 
anything about timing. They do suggest, however, 
that the prospects for devaluation are high and 
rising. 
The external impact on growth 
The second issue for investors is the economic cost/ 
benefit of a devaluation aftershock. The external 
aspect of this issue is the extent to which a 
devaluation can lead to export-led growth, which in 
turn depends on several factors. 
(1) Export market share 
The principal growth benefit from devaluation is a 
rise in export volume: the cheaper currency allows 
a country to undercut its competitors and win 
market share. However, this impact works mainly 
for manufactured goods. Primary commodities such 
as agricultural staples, petroleum, or minerals, have 
a more or less uniform world price, so devaluation 
here merely raises the local currency revenue from 
export, not its volume. 
The implication is that the gain from devaluation is 
proportionate to the manufacturing share of 
merchandise exports. On this count, Latin America 
has a clear disadvantage relative to Asia. As 
illustrated in Chart 6, only 51 % of its merchandise 
exports are in manufacturing, compared with 77% 
for Asia. Within Latin America, the most vulnerable 
are Venezuela (an oil exporter), Chile (minerals) 
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Chart 6 
Manufacturing Share of Merchandise Exporls, 1993 (%) 
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and Argentina (agriculture). Brazil and Mexico, 
with their larger manufacturing sectors, are better 
situated to gain export market share. 
The relative disadvantage of Latin America vis-a-vis 
Asia could be somewhat offset by trade patterns 
(Chart 7). The key issue here is the extent of intra-
regional trade. Regional integration is much more 
advanced in Asia than Latin America: the Asian 
region (including Japan), absorbs over 53% of 
developing Asia exports; the comparable figure for 
Latin America is only 19%. This means that Asia's 
ability to raise export volumes will depend largely 
on its own growth, whereas for Latin America the 
key is growth in the developed economies, 
particularly North America and Europe (where 
most of its exports go). If Asian growth continues to 
slide relative to the G7, the negative impact for 
exports will be bigger in Asia than in Latin America. 
A prolonged economic slowdown in Asia, however, 
could spill over into the G7, with negative effects for 
Latin American exporters. On the whole, therefore, 
export benefits from a devaluation are likely to be 
smaller in Latin America than in Asia. 
(2) Export capacity to import 
Developing country growth is highly 
import-dependent. Most of these economies rely on 
THE BCA EMERGING MARKETS STRATEGIST 
imported capital goods to build their infrastructure 
and manufacturing capacity, as well as on high-tech 
semi-finished products (such as microchips) to feed 
their production runs. 
A country's "export capacity to import" is affected by 
two principal factors: the volume of its exports 
(measured in real terms rather than dollars), and its 
terms of trade (the ratio of export to import prices). 
The way to measure this capacity, therefore, is to 
deflate export revenues by import prices, with the 
result indicating how many "physical units" of 
imports the country could buy for what it exports. 
Here, too, Latin America seems more vulnerable 
(Chart 8). Over the 1991-95 period, its exports were 
able to finance imports equivalent to 17.5% of GDP, 
compared with over 30% in Asia. Particularly 
vulnerable are Brazil and Argentina, whose export 
capacity to import is a mere 10% of GDP. 
(J) The debt-service burden 
Of course, not all exports revenues go to the 
purchase of imports. For most developing countries, 
at least part of these revenues must be used to 
service the external debt - in the form of interest 
and the repayment of principal. The key variable to 
watch here is the ratio of debt services to export 
(Chart 9). 
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Chart 7 
Intra-Regional Exports I Total Exports {°..4, 1995) 
70 
ASIA {including Japan) 
60 
50 
40 
LA TIN AMERICA 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Source: World Bank 
-.._ 
I 
: . .,,) Chart 8 
Export Capacity to Import I GDP {°./o, 1991-95 average) 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 ASIA 
40 LATIN AMERICA 
30 
20 
10 
Source: World Bank 
DECEMBER 1997 THE BCA EMERGING MARKETS STRATEGIST 
8 
Chart 9 
Debt Services I Export ("Ai, 1995-96 average) 
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Devaluation works to raise the debt-service burden 
in two ways. The immediate impact is to force the 
country to export more units for every dollar of debt 
services. The second effect is to raise the country's 
risk premium, and eventually the cost of servicing 
the debt. 
As the data in the chart suggest, Latin America's 
opening position is inferior to Asia's. Its debt service 
costs account for 26% of its exports, compared with 
15% in Asia. 
(4) Export-driven growth? 
Finally, as illustrated in Chart 10, Latin America's 
export sectors are generally smaller than Asia's -
16% of GDP in the former, compared with 27% in 
the latter. Allowing for debt services, far less 
remains to contribute to economic growth: in the 
case of Latin America, the ratio of the "remaining 
exports"-to-GDP ratio falls to 12%, roughly half of 
the corresponding figure of25% in Asia. 
The implication is that in order to add 1 % to overall 
GDP growth, Asian exporters need to raise their 
sales volumes by 4%; in Latin America, they need to 
raise them by 8%. 
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Ranking 
Based on these considerations, devaluation will be 
no panacea for Latin American growth: 
• Its exports will have to grow twice as fast as 
Asia's to make the same contribution to overall 
growth; 
• its export ability to import is almost half as that 
of Asia; 
• and its higher reliance on primary commodities 
will make it more difficult to win market share. 
Although these considerations are difficult to 
aggregate quantitatively, it is possible to give a 
rough indication for the relative position of different 
countries in the two regions. 
Chart 11 ranks these countries on the basis of the 
criteria discussed earlier. For each criterion, 
countries are ranked relative to the group's average 
(expressed in standardized deviations from that 
average). A country's overall position is a simple 
average of its ranking on the different criteria. 
The results confirm the relative vulnerability of 
Latin America to a devaluation. The risk for growth 
appears greatest in Argentina, and is also large in 
Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil. For these 
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Chart 10 
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countries, devaluation is unlikely to generate 
export-led growth. From the Asian countries, the 
most vulnerable is Indonesia, whose high 
dependency on Asian demand and large 
debt-service burden will cap its growth potential. 
In contrast, Chile and particularly Mexico are 
relatively better positioned to weather the storm. In 
Chile, the main weakness is excessive dependency 
on price-inelastic raw material exports, but that is 
more than offset by relatively good readings on the 
other criteria. In Mexico, the main strength comes 
from a high manufacturing contents of exports, and 
reliance on strong demand from the US (which 
absorbs a full 84% of Mexican exports). 
The countries where devaluation is most likely to 
bear positively on export-led growth are all Asian. 
In Korea the principal positive is the large 
manufacturing contents of exports, in Thailand it is 
the relatively small debt-service burden, and in 
Malaysia it is the high capacity to import, the low 
debt-service burden and the very high share of 
export in GDP. 
The domestic cost of devaluation 
In contrast to its direct impact on exports, which is 
generally beneficial for growth, devaluation also has 
a negative, albeit indirect effect on growth. 
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The main reason is the need to maintain tight 
monetary policy. First, investors demand a higher 
risk premium to hold the currency; second, rising 
import prices are feeding into domestic inflation 
and stoke inflationary expectations; and third, 
slower growth in the immediate period after the 
devaluation often lowers government revenues, thus 
loosening the fiscal stance. 
The key question, then, is how vulnerable is the 
domestic sector of Latin America to higher interest 
rates? Although this is hard to quantify, several 
considerations suggest the risk here is larger than 
commonly believed. 
Over the past few months, much has been made of 
the relatively strong domestic fundamentals in Latin 
America. The main argument is that, following the 
aftershock of the 1994 Mexican crisis, Latin America 
has shaken much of its financial excesses. Unlike 
Asia, it bas not developed a property bubble, it does 
not face the overhang of years of excessive liquidity 
growth, and its banking sector is relatively well 
capitalized. 
Chart 12 contrasts industrial growth in the two 
regions. It shows, that while devaluation caught 
Asia at the trough of its cycle, for Latin America the 
risk comes at a cycle peak. On the face ofit, then, it 
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Chart 11 
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seems that the latter is in a better shape to 
withstand the shock. This, however, is only part of 
the story. 
The main problem for Latin America is inflation. As 
illustrated in Chart 15, inflation has been falling 
across the board in emerging markets. However, the 
backdrops in Asia and Latin America are rather 
different In Asia, the situation is one of excess 
capacity, and deflationary or at least disinflationary 
pressures.5 This is not the case in Latin America, 
where investment growth has only begun picking 
up after years of stagnation. 
More importantly, however, is the fact that 
hyper-inflation is still a vivid memory in Latin 
America. Indeed, with the exception of Argentina, 
the region's economies continue to experience 
inflation levels far higher than Asia's, and although 
trade liberalization and foreign investment are 
potent anti-inflationary forces, the risk that inflation 
may reaccelerate cannot be dismissed. 
The implication is that Latin America may need far 
higher real interest rates to offset the inflationary 
pressures of a devaluation. This was the case in 
Mexico after 1994. The devaluation pushed its 
5 See 'The "Asian Miracle": How Close to Maturity?,' The 
BCA Emerging Markets Strategist, November, 1997. 
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inflation rate to 55%, up from less than 10%, and it 
took a prolonged period of very high real interest 
rates to tame it down. 
Real interest rates are already very high in Latin 
America, particularly in Brazil and Argentina. If 
they where to stay high for an extended period of 
time - either to prevent a devaluation or to stabilize 
the currency in its aftermath - the negative impact 
on domestic growth could end up being far larger 
than the export gains from devaluation. 
Last but not least, authorities in Latin America must 
pay more attention to their electorates. Brazil and 
Venezuela enter an election year, Mexico's Congress 
is controlled by the opposition, and Argentina's 
ruling party has just suffered a mid-term election 
defeat from the center-left coalition. All of this 
makes for a strong anti-devaluation stance across 
the region. 
The situation is particularly delicate in Brazil. 
President Cardoso is credited for ending Brazil's 
hyper inflation. If inflation were to return, his 
reelection aspirations will likely be dashed. He 
therefore prefers having to cool his economy 
without inflation, than with it. 
Investment conclusions 
• The short-term risk of a Latin American 
devaluation is high. The region's loss of 
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Chart 12 
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competitiveness has been amplified by the Asian 
currency crisis. If one of the Latin American 
countries devalues, contagion could spread 
rapidly to its neighbors. 
• Following a devaluation, exports will likely 
contribute less to growth in Latin America than 
in Asia. In addition, higher inflation suggests 
Latin America will need to keep interest rates 
higher and for a longer period than in Asia. This 
has negative implications for both the economy 
and domestic liquidity. 
• With stronger and more vocal opposition parties 
throughout the region, authorities have a strong 
stake in defending their currencies. This is 
particularly the case in Brazil, where 
devaluation will likely undermine President 
Cardoso's reelection campaign. 
• In the aftermath of a regional devaluation, the 
most vulnerable economies will likely be those 
of Argentina and Colombia. The least 
vulnerable are Chile and Mexico. 
• Given its outlook for robust profit growth in the 
months ahead, Mexico offers the best 
risk-return combination in the region for equity 
investors. However, with the threat of currency 
contagion being high, investors should hedge 
their peso holdings. 
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Senior Editor 
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